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Language is crucial for human intelligence, but what exactly is its
role? We take language to be a part of a system for understand-
ing and communicating about situations. The human ability to un-
derstand and communicate about situations emerges gradually from
experience and depends on domain-general principles of biological
neural networks: connection-based learning, distributed represen-
tation, and context-sensitive, mutual constraint satisfaction-based
processing. Current artificial language processing systems rely on
the same domain general principles, embodied in artificial neural net-
works. Indeed, recent progress in this field depends on query-based
attention, which extends the ability of these systems to exploit con-
text and has contributed to remarkable breakthroughs. Nevertheless,
most current models focus exclusively on language-internal tasks,
limiting their ability to perform tasks that depend on understanding
situations. These systems also lack memory for the contents of prior
situations outside of a fixed contextual span. We describe the orga-
nization of the brain’s distributed understanding system, which in-
cludes a fast learning system that addresses the memory problem.
We sketch a framework for future models of understanding draw-
ing equally on cognitive neuroscience and artificial intelligence and
exploiting query-based attention. We highlight relevant current di-
rections and consider further developments needed to fully capture
human-level language understanding in a computational system.
Natural Language Understanding | Deep Learning | Situation Models |
Cognitive Neuroscience | Artificial Intelligence
Striking recent advances in machine intelligence have ap-
peared in language tasks. Machines better transcribe speech
and respond in ever more natural sounding voices. Widely
available applications allow one to say something in one lan-
guage and hear its translation in another. Humans perform
better than machines in most language tasks, but these systems
work well enough to be used by billions of people everyday.
What underlies these successes? What limitations do they
face? We argue that progress has come from exploiting prin-
ciples of neural computation employed by the human brain,
while a key limitation is that these systems treat language as
if it can stand alone. We propose that language works in con-
cert with other inputs to understand and communicate about
situations. We describe key aspects of human understanding
and key components of the brain’s understanding system. We
then propose initial steps toward a model informed both by
cognitive neuroscience and artificial intelligence and point to
extensions addressing more abstract cases.
Principles of Neural Computation
The principles of neural computation are domain general,
inspired by the human brain and human abilities. They were
first articulated in the 1950s (1) and further developed in the
1980s in the Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP) framework
for modeling cognition (2). This work introduced the idea that
structure in cognition and language is emergent: it is captured
in learned connection weights supporting the construction of
context-sensitive representations whose characteristics reflect
a gradual, input-statistics dependent, learning process (3).
Classical linguistic theory and most computational linguistics
employs discrete symbols and explicit rules to characterize
language structure and relationships. In neural networks, these
symbols are replaced by continuous, multivariate patterns
called distributed representations or embeddings and the rules
are replace by continuous, multi-valued arrays of connection
weights that map patterns to other patterns.
Since its introduction (3), debate has raged about this
approach to language processing (4). Protagonists argue it
supports nuanced, context- and similarity-sensitive processing
that is reflected in the quasi-regular relationships between
phrases and their sounds, spellings, and meanings (5, 6). These
models also capture subtle aspects of human performance in
language tasks (7). However, critics note that neural networks
often fail to generalize beyond their training data, blaming
these failures on the absence of explicit rules (8–10).
Another key principle is mutual constraint satisfaction (11).
For example, interpreting a sentence requires resolving both
syntactic and semantic ambiguity. If we hear A boy hit a man
with a bat, we tend to assume with a bat attaches to the verb
(syntax) and thereby the instrument of hitting (semantics).
However, if beard replaces bat, then with a beard is attached
to man (syntax) and describes the person affected (semantics)
(12). Even segmenting language into elementary units depends
on meaning and context (Fig. 1). Rumelhart (11) envisioned
a model in which estimates of the probability of all aspects of
an input constrain estimates of the probabilities of all others,
motivating a model of context effects in perception (13) that
launched the PDP approach.
Neural Language Modeling
Initial steps. Elman (14) introduced a simple recurrent neural
network (RNN) (Fig. 2a) that captured key characteristics of
language structure through learning, a feat once considered
impossible (15). It was trained to predict the next word in a
sequence (w(t+ 1)) based on the current word (w(t)) and its
own hidden (that is, learned internal) representation from the
previous time step (h(t−1)). Each of these inputs is multiplied
by a matrix of connection weights (arrows labeled Whi and
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Fig. 1. Context influences the identification of letters in written text: the visual input
we read as went in the first sentence and event in the second is the same bit of
Rumelhart’s handwriting, cut and pasted into each context. Reprinted from (11).
Whh in Fig. 2a) and the results are added to produce the input
to the hidden units. The elements of this vector pass through
a function limiting the range of their values, producing the
hidden representation. This in turn is multiplied with weights
to the output layer from the hidden layer (Woh) to generate a
vector used to predict the probability of each of the possible
successor words. Learning is based on the discrepancy between
the network’s output and the actual next word; the values
of the connection weights are adjusted by a small amount to
reduce the discrepancy. The network is recurrent because the
same connection weights (denoted by arrows in the figure) are
used to process each successive word.
Elman showed two things. First, after training his network
to predict the next word in sentences like man eats bread, dog
chases cat, and girl sleeps, the network’s representations cap-
tured the syntactic distinction between nouns and verbs (14).
They also captured interpretable subcategories, as shown by a
hierarchical clustering of the hidden representations of the dif-
ferent words (Fig. 2b). This illustrates a key feature of learned
representations: they capture specific as well as general or
abstract information. By using a different learned representa-
tion for each word, its specific predictive consequences can be
exploited. Because representations for words that make similar
predictions are similar, and because neural networks exploit
similarity, the network can share knowledge about predictions
among related words.
Second, Elman (16) used both simple sentences like boy
chases dogs and more complex ones like boy who sees girls
chases dogs. In the latter, the verb chases must agree with
the first noun (boy), not the closest noun (girls), since the
sentence contains a main clause (boy chases dogs) interrupted
by a reduced relative clause (boy [who] sees girls). The model
learned to predict the verb form correctly despite the interven-
ing clause, showing that it acquired sensitivity to the syntactic
structure of language, not just local co-occurrence statistics.
Scaling up to natural text. Elman’s task of predicting words
based on context has been central to neural language modeling.
However, Elman trained his networks with tiny, toy languages.
For many years, it seemed they would not scale up, and
language modeling was dominated by simple n-gram models
and systems designed to assign explicit structural descriptions
to sentences, aided by advances in probabilistic computations
(17). Over the past 10 years, breakthroughs have allowed
networks to predict and fill in words in huge natural language
corpora.
One challenge is the large size of a natural language’s
vocabulary. A key step was the introduction of methods
for learning word representations (now called embeddings)
from co-occurrence relationships in large text corpora (18, 19).
These embeddings exploit both general and specific predictive
Fig. 2. (a) Elman’s (1990) simple recurrent network and (b) his hierarchical clustering
of the representations it learned, reprinted from (14).
relationships of all the words in the corpus, improving gener-
alization: task-focused neural models trained on small data
sets better generalize to infrequent words (e.g., settee) based
on frequent words (e.g. couch) with similar embeddings.
A second challenge is the indefinite length of the context
that might be relevant for prediction. Consider this passage:
John put some beer in a cooler and went out with his
friends to play volleyball. Soon after he left, someone
took the beer out of the cooler. John and his friends
were thirsty after the game, and went back to his place
for some beers. When John opened the cooler, he
discovered that the beer was ___.
Here a reader expects the missing word to be gone. Yet if we
replace took the beer with took the ice, the expected word is
warm. Any amount of additional text between beer and gone
does not change the predictive relationship, challenging RNNs
like Elman’s. An innovation called Long-short-term memory
(LSTM) (20) partially addressed this problem by augmenting
the recurrent network architecture with learned connection
weights that gate information into and out of a network’s
internal state. However, LSTMs did not fully alleviate the
context bottleneck problem (21): a network’s internal state
was still a fixed-length vector, limiting its ability to capture
contextual information.
Query-based attention. Recent breakthroughs depend on an
innovation we call query-based attention (QBA) (21). It was
used in the Google Neural Machine Translation system (22),
a system that attained a sudden leap in performance and
attracted widespread public interest (23).
We illustrate QBA in Fig. 3 with the sentence John hit the
ball with the bat. Context is required to determine whether
bat refers to an animal or a baseball bat. QBA addresses this
by issuing queries for relevant information. A query might
ask ‘is there an action and relation in the context that would
indicate which kind of bat fits best?’ The embeddings of
words that match the query then receive high weightings in
the weighted attention vector. In our example, the query
matches the embedding of hit closely and of with to some
extent; the returned attention vector captures the content
needed to determine that a baseball bat fits in this context.
There are many variants of QBA; the figure presents a
simple version. One important QBA model called BERT (25)
uses both preceding and following context. In BERT, the
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Fig. 3. Query-based attention (QBA). To constrain the interpretation of the word bat
in the context John hit the ball with the __, a query generated from bat is used to
construct a weighted attention vector which shapes the word’s interpretation. The
query is compared to each of the learned representation vectors (RepVs) of the
context words; this creates a set of similarity scores (Sims) which in turn produce a
set of weightings (Ws, a set of positive numbers summing to 1). The Ws are used
to scale the RepVs of the context words, creating Scaled RepVs. The weighted
attention vector is the element-wise sum of the Scaled RepVs. The Query, RepVs,
Sims, Scaled RepVs and weighted attention vector use red color intensity for positive
magnitudes and blue for negative magnitudes. Ws are shown as green color intensity.
White = 0 throughout. The Query and RepVs were made up for illustration, inspired by
(24). Mathematical details: For query q and representation vector vj for context word
j, the similarity score sj is cos (q, vj). The sj are converted into weightings wj by
the softmax function, wj=e(gsj)/(Σj′e(gsj′)), where the sum in the denominator
runs over all words in the context span, and g is a scale factor.
network is trained to correct missing or randomly replaced
words in blocks of text, typically spanning two sentences.
BERT relies on multiple attention heads, each employing
QBA (26), concatenating the returned weighted vectors to
form a composite vector. The process is iterated across several
stages, so that contextually constrained representations of
each word computed at intermediate stages in turn constrain
the representations of every other word in later stages. In
this way, BERT employs mutual constraint satisfaction, as
Rumelhart (11) envisioned. The contextualized embeddings
that result from QBA can capture gradations within the set of
meanings a language maps to a given word, aiding translation
and other down-stream tasks. For example, in English, we
use ball for many types of balls, whereas in French, some are
balles and others ballons. Subtly different embeddings for ball
in different English sentences aids selecting the correct French
translation.
In QBA architectures, the vectors all depend on learned
connection weights, and analysis of BERT’s representations
shows that they capture syntactic structure well (24). Different
attention heads capture different linguistic relationships, and
the similarity relationships among the contextually-shaded
word representations can be used to reconstruct a sentence’s
syntactic structural description. These representations capture
this structure without building it in, supporting the emergence
principle. That said, careful analysis (27) indicates the deep
network’s sensitivity to grammatical structure is still imperfect,
and only partially understood.
Some attention-based models (28) proceed sequentially,
predicting each word using QBA over prior context, while
BERT uses parallel processing or mutual QBA simultaneously
on all the words in a pair of sentences. Humans appear
to exploit past context and a limited window of subsequent
context (29), suggesting a hybrid strategy. Some machine
models adopt this approach (30), and below we adopt a hybrid
approach as well.
Attention-based models have produced remarkable improve-
ments on a wide range of language tasks. The models can be
pre-trained on massive text corpora, providing useful repre-
sentations for subsequent fine tuning to perform other tasks.
A recent model called GPT-3 achieves impressive gains on sev-
eral benchmarks without requiring fine-tuning (28). However,
this model still falls short of human performance on tasks
that depend on what the authors call "common sense physics"
and on carefully crafted tests of their ability to determine if
a sentence follows from a preceding text (31). Further, the
text corpora these models rely on are far larger than a hu-
man learner could process in a lifetime. Gains from further
increases may be diminishing, and human learners appear to
be far more data-efficient. The authors of GPT-3 note these
limitations and express the view that further improvements
may require more fundamental changes.
Language in an Integrated Understanding System
Where should we look for further progress addressing the
limitations of current language models? In concert with others
(32), we argue that part of the solution will come from treating
language as part of a larger system for understanding and
communicating.
Situations.We adopt the perspective that the targets of under-
standing are situations. Situations are collections of entities,
their properties and relations, and patterns of change in them.
A situation can be static (e.g., a cat on a mat). Situations in-
clude events (e.g., a boy hitting a ball). Situations can embed
within each other; the cat may be on a mat inside a house on
a particular street in a particular town, and the same applies
to events like baseball games. A situation can be conceptual,
social or legal, such as one where a court invalidates a law. A
situation may even be imaginary. The entities participating in
a situation or event may be real or fictitious physical objects or
locations; animals, persons, groups or organizations; beliefs or
other states of mind; sets of objects (e.g., all dogs); symbolic
objects such as symbols, tokens or words; or even contracts,
laws, or theories. Situations can even involve changes in beliefs
about relationships among classes of objects (e.g. biologists’
beliefs about the genus a species of trees belongs in).
What it means for an agent to understand a situation is
to construct a representation of it that captures aspects of
the participating objects, their properties, relationships and
interactions, and resulting outcomes. We emphasize that the
understanding should be thought of as a construal or interpre-
tation that may be incomplete or inaccurate. The construal
will depend on the culture and context of the agent and the
agent’s purpose. When other agents are the source of the in-
put, the target agent’s construal of the knowledge and purpose
of these other agents also play important roles. As such, the
construal process must be considered to be completely open
ended and to potentially involve interaction between the con-
struer and the situation, including exploration of the world and
discourse between the agent and participating interlocutors.
Within this construal of understanding, we emphasize that
language should be seen as a component of an understanding
system. This idea is not new, but historically it was not univer-
sally accepted. Chomsky, Fodor and others (8, 33, 34) argued
that grammatical knowledge sits in a distinct, encapsulated
subsystem. Our proposal to focus on language as part of a
system representing situations builds on a long tradition in
linguistics (35), human cognitive psychology (36), psycholin-
guistics (37), philosophy (38) and artificial intelligence (39).
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The approach was adopted in an early neural network model
(40) and aligns with other current perspectives in cognitive
neuroscience (41) and artificial intelligence (32).
People construct situation representations.A person processing
language constructs a representation of the described situation
in real time, using both the stream of words and other available
information. Words and their sequencing serve as clues to
meaning (42) that jointly constrain the understanding of the
situation (40). Consider this passage:
John spread jam on some bread. The knife had been
dipped in poison.
We make many inferences: the jam was spread with the poi-
soned knife and poison has been transferred to the bread. If
John eats it he may die! Note the entities are objects, not
words, and the situation could be conveyed by a silent movie.
Evidence that humans construct situation representations
from language comes from classic work by Bransford and
colleagues (36, 43). This work demonstrates that (1) we un-
derstand and remember texts better when we can relate the
text to a familiar situation; (2) relevant information can come
from a picture accompanying the text; (3) what we remember
from a text depends on the framing context; (4) we represent
objects in memory that were not explicitly mentioned; and (5)
after hearing a sentence describing spatial or conceptual rela-
tionships, we remember these relationships, not the language
itself. For example, given Two frogs rested beside a floating log
and a fish swam under it, the situation changes if it is replaced
by them. After hearing the original sentence, people reject
the variant with it in it as the sentence they heard before,
but if the initial sentence said the frogs rested on the log, the
situation is unchanged by replacing it with them, and people
accept this variant.
Evidence from eye movements shows that people use lin-
guistic and non-linguistic input jointly and immediately (44).
Just after hearing The man will drink ... participants look
at a full wine glass rather than an empty beer glass (45).
After hearing The man drank, they look at the empty beer
glass. Understanding thus involves constructing, in real time,
a representation conveyed jointly by vision and language.
The compositionality of situations. An important debate in
cognitive science and AI centers on compositionality. Fodor
and Pylyshyn (8) argued that our cognitive systems must be
compositional by design to allow language to express arbitrary
relationships and noted that early neural network models failed
tests of compositionality. Such failures are still reported (46)
leading some to propose building compositionality in (10);
yet, as we have seen, the most successful language models
avoid doing so. We suggest that a focus on situations may
enhance compositionality because situations are themselves
compositional. Suppose a person picks an apple and gives it
to someone. A small number of objects and persons are focally
involved, and the effects on other persons and objects are likely
to be local. A sentence like John picked an apple and gave
it to Mary could describe this situation, capturing the most
relevant participants and their relationships. We emphasize
that compositionality is predominant and approximate, not
universal or absolute, so it is best to allow for these matters
of degree. Letting situation representations emerge through
experience will help our models to achieve greater systematicity,
Fig. 4. Sketch of the brain’s understanding system. Ovals in the blue box stand
for neocortical brain areas representing different kinds of information. Arrows in the
neocortex stand for connections allowing representations to constrain each other. The
medial temporal lobe (red box) stores an integrated representation of the neocortical
system state arising from an experience. The red arrow represents fast-learning
connections that store this pattern for later reactivation and use. Green arrows stand
for gradually learned connections supporting bidirectional influence between the MTL
and neocortex. (A) and (B) are two example inputs discussed in the main text.
while leaving them with the flexibility that has led to their
successes to date.
Language informs us about situations. Situations ground the
representations we construct from language; equally impor-
tantly, language informs us about situations. Language tells us
about situations we have not witnessed and describes aspects
that we cannot observe. Language also communicates folk or
scientific construals that shape listener’s construals, such as
the idea that an all-knowing being took six days to create the
world or the idea that natural processes gave rise to our world
and ultimately ourselves over billions of years. Language can
be used to communicate information about properties that
only arise in a social setting, such as ownership, or that have
been identified by a culture as important, such as exact num-
ber. Language thus enriches and extends the information
we have about situations and provides the primary medium
conveying properties of many kinds of objects and many kinds
of relationships.
Toward a Brain and AI Inspired Model of Understanding
Capturing the full range of situations is clearly a long-term
challenge. We return to this later, focusing first on concrete
situations involving animate beings and physical objects. We
seek to integrate insights from cognitive neuroscience and
artificial intelligence toward the goal of building an integrated
understanding model. We start with our construal of the
understanding system in the human brain and then sketch
aspects of what an artificial implementation might look like.
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The understanding system in the brain. Our construal of the
human integrated understanding system builds on the princi-
ples of mutual constraint satisfaction and emergence and with
the idea that understanding centers on the construction of
situation representations. It is consistent with a wide range of
evidence, some of which we review, and is broadly consistent
with recent characterizations in cognitive neuroscience (41, 47).
However, researchers hold diverse views about the details of
these systems and how they work together.
We focus first on the part of the system located primarily
in the neocortex of the brain, as schematized in the large
blue box of Fig. 4. Together with input and output systems,
this allows a person to combine linguistic and visual input
to understand the situation referred to upon hearing a sen-
tence, such as one containing the word bat, while observing a
corresponding situation in the world. It is important to note
that the neocortex is very richly structured, with on the order
of 100 well-defined anatomical subdivisions. However, it is
common and useful to group these divisions into subsystems.
The ones we focus on here are each indicated by a blue oval in
the figure. One subsystem subserves the formation of a visual
representation of the given situation, and another subserves
the formation of an auditory representation capturing the
spatiotemporal structure of the co-occurring spoken language.
The three ovals above these provide representations of more
integrative/abstract types of information (see below).
Within each subsystem, and between each connected pair
of subsystems, the neurons are reciprocally interconnected via
learning-dependent pathways allowing mutual constraint satis-
faction among all of the elements of each of the representation
types, as indicated by the looping blue arrows from each oval
to itself and by the bi-directional blue arrows between these
ovals. Brain regions for representing visual and auditory inputs
are well-established, and the evidence for their involvement in
a mutual constraint satisfaction process with more integrative
brain areas has been reviewed elsewhere (48, 49). Here we
consider the three more integrative subsystems.
Object representations.A brain area near the front of the tempo-
ral lobe houses neurons whose activity provides an embedding
capturing the properties of objects (50). Damage to this area
impairs the ability to name objects, to grasp them correctly
for their intended use, to match them with their names or
the sounds they make, and to pair objects that go together,
either from their names or from pictures. This brain area is
itself an inter-modal area, receiving visual, language and other
information about objects such as the sounds they make and
how they feel to the touch. Models capturing these findings
(51) treat this area as the hidden layer of an interactive, re-
current network with bidirectional connections to other layers
representing different types of object properties, including the
object’s name. In these models, an input to any of these
other layers activates the corresponding pattern in the hidden
layer, which in turn activates the corresponding patterns in
the other layers. This supports, for example, the ability to
produce the name of an object from visual input. Damage
(simulated by removing neurons in the hidden layer) degrades
the model’s representations, capturing the patterns of errors
made by patients with the condition.
Representation of context.There is a network of areas in the
brain that capture the large-scale spatiotemporal context of
fine-grained static situations and short time scale events (here-
after micro-situations) that can be conveyed by a sentence like
the boy hit the ball with a bat. These context representations
arise in a set of interconnected areas primarily within the pari-
etal lobes (41, 47). In recent work, brain imaging data is used
to analyze the time-varying patterns of neural activity while
processing a temporally extended narrative. The brain activity
patterns that represent scenes extending over tens of seconds
(e.g., a detective searching a suspect’s apartment for evidence)
are largely the same, whether the information comes from
watching a movie, hearing or reading a narrative description,
or recalling the movie after having seen it (52, 53). Activa-
tions in different brain areas track information at different
time scales. Activity in modality-specific areas associated with
speech and visual processing follows the moment-by-moment
time course of spoken and/or visual information while activ-
ity in the network associated with situation representations
fluctuates on a much longer time scale. During processing
of narrative information, activations in these regions tends
to be relatively stable within a scene and punctuated with
larger changes at boundaries between these scenes, and these
patterns lose their coherence when the narrative structure
is scrambled (41, 53). Larger-scale spatial transitions (e.g.,
transitions between rooms) also create large changes in neural
activity (47).
The role of language.Where in the brain should we look for
representations of the relations among the objects participating
in a micro-situation? The effects of brain damage suggest that
representations of relations may be integrated, at least in part,
with the representation of language itself. Injuries affecting
the lateral surface of the frontal and parietal lobes produce
profound deficits in the production of fluent language, but
can leave the ability to read and understand concrete nouns
largely intact. Such lesions produce intermediate degrees
of impairment to abstract nouns, verbs, and modifiers, and
profound impairment to words like if and by that capture
grammatical and spatial relations (54). This striking pattern
is consistent with the view that language itself is intimately
tied to the representation of relations and changes in relations
(information conveyed by verbs, prepositions, and grammatical
markers). Indeed, the frontal and parietal lobes are associated
with representation of space and action (which causes change in
relations), and patients with lesions to the frontal and parietal
language-related areas have profound deficits in relational
reasoning tasks (55). We therefore tentatively suggest that the
understanding of micro-situations depends jointly on the object
and language systems, and that the language is intimately link
to representation of spatial relationships and actions.
Complementary learning systems.The brain systems described
above support understanding of situations that draw on gen-
eral knowledge as well as oft-repeated personal knowledge, but
they do not support the formation of new memories that can
be accessed and used at an arbitrary later time. This ability
depends on structures that include the hippocampus in the me-
dial temporal lobes (MTL; Fig. 4, red box). While these areas
are critical for new learning, damage to them does not affect
general knowledge, acquired skills, or the ability to process
language and other forms of input to understand a situation—
except when this depends on remote information experienced
briefly outside the immediate current context (56). These
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findings are captured in the neural-network based complemen-
tary learning systems (CLS) theory (57–59), which holds that
connections within the neocortex acquire the knowledge that
allows a human to understand objects and their properties, to
link words and objects, and to understand and communicate
about generic situations as these are conveyed through lan-
guage and other forms of experience. According to this theory,
the learning process is necessarily gradual, allowing it to cap-
ture the nuanced statistical structure of experience. The MTL
provides a complementary fast-learning system supporting the
formation of new arbitrary associations, linking the elements
of an experience together, including the objects and language
encountered in a situation and the co-occurring spatiotemporal
context, as might arise in the situation depicted in Fig. 4B,
where a person encounters the word numbat from both visual
and language input.
It is generally accepted that knowledge that depends ini-
tially on the MTL can be integrated into the neocortex through
a consolidation process (56). In CLS (58), the neocortex learns
arbitrary new information gradually through interleaved pre-
sentations of new and familiar items, weaving it into the fabric
of knowledge and avoiding interference with existing knowl-
edge (60). The details are subjects of current debate and
ongoing investigation (61).
As in our example of the beer John left in the cooler, under-
standing often depends on remote information. People exploit
such information during language processing (62), and patients
with MTL damage have difficulty understanding or producing
extended narratives (63); they are also profoundly impaired in
learning new words for later use (64). Neural language models,
including those using QBA, also lack these capabilities. In
BERT and related models, bi-directional attention operates
within a span of a couple of sentences at a time. Other models
(28) employ QBA over longer spans of prior context, but there
is still a finite limit. These models learn gradually like the
human neocortical system, allowing them to capture structure
in experience and acquire knowledge of word meaning. GPT-3
(28) is impressive in its ability to use a word encountered for
the first time within its contextual span appropriately in a
subsequent sentence, but this information is lost forever when
the context is re-initialized, as it would be in a patient without
the medial temporal lobe. Including an MTL-like system in
future understanding models would address this limitation.
The brain’s complementary learning systems may provide
a means to address the challenge of learning to use a word
encountered in a single context appropriately across a wide
range of contexts. Deep neural networks that learn gradually
through many repetitions of an item that occurs in a single
context, interleaved with presentations of other items occurring
in a diversity of contexts, do not show this ability (46). We
attribute this failure to the fact that the distribution of training
experiences they receive conveys the information that the
target item is in fact restricted to its single context. Further
research should explore whether augmenting a model like GPT-
3 with an MTL-like memory would enable more human-like
extension of a novel word encountered just once to a wider
range of contexts.
Next steps toward a brain and AI-inspired model. Given the
construal we have described of the human understanding sys-
tem, we now ask, what might an implementation of a model
consistent with it be like? This is a long-term research ques-
tion – addressing it will benefit from a greater convergence of
cognitive neuroscience and AI. Toward this goal, we sketch a
proposal for a brain and AI-inspired model. We rely on the
principles of mutual constraint satisfaction and emergence, the
query-based attention architecture from AI and deep learn-
ing, and the components and their interconnections in the
understanding system in the brain, as illustrated in Fig. 4.
We treat the system as one that receives sequences of
picture-description (PD) pairs grouped into episodes that in
turn form story-length narratives, with the language conveyed
by text rather than speech. Our sketch leaves important
issues open and will require substantial development. Steps
toward addressing some of these issues are already being taken:
mutual QBA is already being used, e.g., in (65), to exploit
audio and visual information from movies.
In our proposed model, each PD pair is processed by inter-
acting object and language subsystems, receiving visual and
text input at the same time. Each subsystem must learn to
restore missing or distorted elements (words in the language
subsystem, objects in the object subsystem) by using mutual
QBA as in BERT, allowing each element in each subsystem
to be constrained by all of the elements in both sub-systems.
Additionally these systems will query the context and memory
subsystems, as described below.
The context subsystem encodes a sequence of compressed
representations of the previous PD pairs within the current
episode. Processing in this subsystem would be sequential
over pairs, allowing the network constructing the current com-
pressed representation to query the representations of past
pairs within the episode. Within the processing of a pair, the
context system would engage in mutual QBA with the object
and language subsystems, allowing the language and object
subsystems to indirectly exploit information from past pairs
within the episode.
Our system also includes an MTL-like memory to allow
it to use remote information beyond the current episode. A
neural network with learned connection weights constructs a
reduced description of the state of the object, language, and
context modules along with their inputs from vision and text
after processing each PD pair. Building on existing artificial
systems with external memory (66, 67) this compressed vector
is stored as a vector in a slot in an external memory. These
states are then accessible to the cortical subsystems via QBA.
The system would employ a flexible querying scheme, such that
any subset of the object, language, or context representations
of an input currently being processed would contribute to
accessing relevant MTL representations. There contents would
then be to all of the cortical subsystems using QBA. Thus, the
appearance of a numbat in a visual scene would retrieve the
corresponding language and context information containing its
name and the fact that it eats termites, based on prior storage
of the the compressed representation formed previously from
the inputs in Fig. 4B.
Ultimately, our model may benefit from a subsystem that
guides processing in all of the subsystems we have described.
The brain has such a system in its frontal lobes; damage to
this system leads to impairments in guiding behavior and cog-
nition according to current task demands, and others advocate
including such a system in neural AI systems (68). We leave it
to future work to consider how to integrate such a subsystem
into the model we have described here.
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Enhancing understanding by incorporating interaction with
the physical and social world. A complete model of the hu-
man understanding system will require integration of many
additional information sources. These include sounds, touch
and force-sensing, and information about one’s own actions.
Every source provides opportunities to predict information of
each type, relying on every other type. Information salient
in one source can bootstrap learning and inference in the
other, and all are likely to contribute to enhancing composi-
tionality and addressing the data-inefficiency of learning from
language alone. This affords the human learner an important
opportunity to experience the compositional structure of the
environment through its own actions. Ultimately, an ability to
link one’s actions to their consequences as one behaves in the
world should contribute to the emergence of, and appreciation
for, the compositional structure of events, and provide a basis
for acquiring notions of cause and effect, of agency, and of
object permanence (69).
These considerations motivate recent work on agent-
based language learning in simulated interactive 3D environ-
ments (70–73). In (74), an agent was trained to identify, lift,
carry and place objects relative to other objects in a virtual
room, as specified by simplified language instructions. At each
time step, the agent received a first-person visual observation
and processed the pixels to obtain a representation of the scene.
This was concatenated to the final state of an LSTM that
processed the instruction, and then passed to an integrative
LSTM whose output was used to select a motor action. The
agent gradually learned to follow instructions of the form find
a pencil, lift up a basketball and put the teddy bear on the bed,
encompassing 50 objects and requiring up to 70 action steps.
Such instructions require constructing representations based
on language stimuli that support identification of objects and
relations across space and time and the integration of this
information to inform motor behaviors.
Importantly, without building in explicit object representa-
tions, the learned system was able to interpret novel instruc-
tions. For instance, an agent trained to lift each of 20 objects,
but only trained to put 10 of those in a specific location could
place the remaining objects in the same location on command
with over 90% accuracy, demonstrating a degree of compo-
sitionality in its behavior. Notably, the agent’s ego-centric,
multimodal and temporally-extended experience contributed
to this outcome; both an alternative agent with a fixed perspec-
tive on a 2D grid world and a static neural network classifier
that received only individual still images exhibited significantly
worse generalization. This underscores how affording neural
networks access to rich, multi-modal interactive environments
can stimulate the development of capacities that are essen-
tial for language learning, and contribute toward emergent
compositionality.
Beyond concrete situations. How might our approach be ex-
tended beyond concrete situations to those involving relation-
ships among objects like laws, belief systems, and scientific
theories? Basic word embeddings themselves capture some
abstract relations via vector similarity, e.g., encoding that
justice is closer to law than peanut. Words are uttered in real
world contexts and there is a continuum between grounding
and language-based linking for different words and different
uses of words. For example, career is not only linked to other
abstract words like work and specialization but also to more
concrete ones like path and its extended metaphorical use as
the means to achieve goals (75). Embodied, simulation-based
approaches to meaning (76, 77) build on this observation to
bridge from concrete to abstract situations via metaphor. They
posit that understanding words like grasp is linked to neural
representations of the action of grabbing and that this cir-
cuitry is recruited for understanding contexts such as grasping
an idea. We consider situated agents as a critical catalyst
for learning about how to represent and compose concepts
pertaining to spatial, physical and other perceptually imme-
diate phenomena—thereby providing a grounded edifice that
can connect both to brain circuitry for motor action and to
representations derived primarily from language.
Conclusion
Language does not stand alone. The understanding system in
the brain connects language to representations of objects and
situations and enhances language understanding by exploiting
the full range of our multi-sensory experience of the world,
our representations of our motor actions, and our memory
of previous situations. We believe next generation language
understanding systems should emulate this system and we
have sketched an approach that incorporates recent machine
learning breakthroughs to build a jointly brain and AI in-
spired understanding system. We emphasize understanding
of concrete situations and argue that understanding abstract
language should build upon this foundation, pointing toward
the possibility of one day building artificial systems that under-
stand abstract situations far beyond concrete, here-and-now
situations. In sum, combining insights from neuroscience and
AI will take us closer to human-level language understanding.
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